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The aim is to create, here in Britain, a really hostile environment for illegal 
immigrants (Theresa May 2012, quoted in Kirkup and Winnett 2012).  
 
Just go home. We voted you out. You will have to leave the country soon (told to an 
Eastern European Woman in the street after Brexit referendum, in Burnett 2016: 7) 
 
One of the most striking features of contemporary Europe is the ‘authoritarian turn’ which is 
transforming the regions political bodies: its democratic institutions; state actors; and the 
views and values of its voting publics. Since 2015, a year which saw the arrival of a million 
refugees on European borders1, one of the major characteristics of this ‘authoritarian turn’ has 
been the institution of progressively illiberal immigration policies and practices. This 
hardening of border controls was initially most noticeable in Central and Eastern Europe 
states.2 However, this anti-migrant turn is also evident in democratic states further West, 
where previously marginalised right-wing immigration politics and ethnonationalist public 
discourses are incrementally transforming state policies and practices. Focusing on Britain, 
this article considers one of the key features of this shift, the rise of deportation, or more 
precisely the adoption of policies which make increasing numbers of residents ‘deportable’. It 
focuses throughout on a very particular political body, that of the politician Theresa May, and 
considers what her promotion from deportation-enthusiast Home Secretary to ‘protectionist’ 
Brexit Prime-Minister signals, in terms of the increasing centrality of ‘deportability’ as a 
mode of government and a mechanism of social control.  
 
This article begins with the highly-publicised appearance of the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, and his (then) Home Secretary Theresa May, at the scene of an immigration raid in 
Slough in 2014. Employing this event as a point of entry, this article examines a British 
Government initiative designed to create what May described in a speech to Parliament in 
2012 as "a really hostile environment for illegal migrants in Britain". It considers the 
subsequent implementation of this hostile environment and the intensification of deportation 
as a technology of government which it involved. It also examines how this politics of 
deportability came to characterise the 2015 Brexit campaign and the racist violence which 
followed in its wake. It argues that the "production of deportability" has been the defining 
feature of Theresa May's tenure as Home Secretary (2010-2016) and Prime-Minister (2016-
current) (De Genova & Peutz 2010: 17). It concludes by considering migrant deportability, 
and associated forms of citizen disposability, as central components of late neoliberal forms 
of state power. It is the argument of this article that thinking with and through deportation can 
further our understanding of the relationship between the increasing precarity of migrant lives 
and the current intensification of ‘legalised expulsions’ “at home” (Walters, 2002). 
 
1.  Slough, England, July 29th 2014 
As dawn broke on July 29th 2014, British Government Immigration Enforcement Officers 
began immigration raids at two houses in Slough, an ethnically diverse suburban town 20 
miles west of central London. Acting on a 'tip-off', the ostensible aim of these raids was to 
apprehend any occupants deemed to be illegally resident in the UK in order to forcibly deport 
them. Officials later reported from the scene that seven people had been removed from two 
properties: four Albanian men and a child without papers, a Kenyan woman and an Indian 
man, who had overstayed visitor visas. The six adults were taken to immigration detention 
centres to be processed and 'fast-tracked' for deportation; the child was put into the care of 
social services. What distinguished this particular dawn raid from the many thousands of 
immigration raids now ordinarily carried out each year in the UK, were the journalists, 
photographers and television crews who accompanied the Immigration Enforcement Officers 
on the raid. At approximately 11.30 a.m., some six hours after the raid had commenced, the 
then Prime Minister, David Cameron (2010-2016), and his Home Secretary, Theresa May, 
arrived on the scene. They were photographed in the kitchen, living room and bedroom of one 
of the raided houses, being shown passports and other documents by Paul Wylie, Director of 
Immigration Enforcement for London and the South of England (figure 1). By lunchtime, 
video footage of Cameron and May at the immigration raids was being trailed as a lead story 
on all the major British television news channels. This was a carefully planned and 
orchestrated piece of political theatre. 
The day before the raids in Slough, a series of new draconian border enforcement 
provisions made under The Immigration Act 2014 had come into force. These included: 
requirements for landlords to verify the immigration status of potential tenants; restrictions on 
non-citizens opening bank accounts; powers to revoke migrants' driving licences; and what 
Theresa May called a "deport first, appeal later" policy.3 This event in Slough was designed to 
demonstrate the State's enlarged arsenal of powers to deport unwelcome migrants.  
To make this event newsworthy, the Home Office collaborated with photographers, 
journalists, television companies and newspaper editors, who assisted in the storying and 
distribution of this 'deportation spectacular'. On the morning of the dawn raid, an article 
ostensibly authored by Cameron was published in The Telegraph which outlined the 
considerable powers afforded by the new Act and announced additional measures to curb EU 
migrants' access to welfare benefits and services (Cameron 2014). This article was titled 
'We're building an immigration system that puts Britain first', a phrase Cameron would repeat 
verbatim to journalists in Slough. By mid-morning, high-resolution photographs of Cameron 
and May at the scene of the raids were available to purchase on Getty Images.4. ITN, a 
British-based commercial television news company, had been 'contracted' to film the raids 
and to interview Cameron at the scene. By mid-day, screening rights to the video footage 
were available to buy online. Together, these materials enabled broadcasters to produce a 
'breaking news story' for the lunchtime television news bulletin.  
In one of the ITN video clips, Paul Wylie is heard telling Cameron and May "they should 
be out [of the country] in a week".5 'They', the people arrested that morning, remained 
nameless, their faces obscured by pixilation in photographs and video footage, their stories 
and eventual destinies unreported and unknown. In contrast, the most heavily used clip from 
the ITN footage featured the Prime Minister standing outside a raided house. In a carefully 
scripted address to camera, Cameron states: 
We want an immigration system that puts Britain first and so what we're doing 
today is a whole series of changes that says to people if you come here illegally 
we will make it harder for you to have a home, to get a car, to have a job, to get a 
bank account, and when we find you - and we will find you - we'll make sure 
you're sent back to the country that you came from. …If you're here illegally you 
should go home (transcribed from the ITN footage embedded in the Telegraph 
online news story, my emphasis, Cameron 2014). 
As the Prime Minister speaks to camera, the video footage cuts back to earlier scenes of the 
immigration 'snatch squad' forcing their way into houses and escorting occupants to waiting 
vans. Cameron's menacing message to "you illegals" to "go home", is edited to align his 
'tough words' with the actions of the immigration 'snatch squad'. Indeed, as the elected leader 
of the nation's citizens, Cameron is framed in this clip as an embodiment of the border itself. 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of tweet from David Cameron's official twitter feed, 29 July 2014 at 
12.21 p.m., pictured with Theresa May and Paul Wylie in the kitchen of a raided house. 
 
Since the 1990s, deportation has been "routinely capitalized on in governmental rhetoric" as a 
means of demonstrating effective control over borders and immigration (Tyler 2013: 71). As 
Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz argue, "deportation is not only a technique by which 
governments exert their sovereign power over bodies, space, and 'the nation'; it has become a 
mechanism by which governments measure and signal their own effectiveness" (2010: 5). 
However, while the symbolism of deportation is increasingly invoked as a threat in political 
rhetoric, the actual practices of deportation, including dawn raids on homes and properties, 
arrests, detentions and the physical removal of people from British territory, are distressing 
and sometimes violent procedures. Indeed, these are kinds of activities which senior 
politicians would ordinarily seek to visually distance themselves from. Given this, the high-
profile, if carefully curated, appearance of the British Prime Minister and his Home Secretary 
at an immigration raid is unusual. Indeed, stepping back from the scene at Slough, there is 
something extraordinary about the media spectacle of Britain's most senior politicians at the 
scene of a deportation.  
 
2.  Go Home  
In The Deportation Machine (2005), Liz Fekete examines earlier collaborations between the 
British Government and news organisations in the production of border enforcement 
propaganda. As Feteke details, it was under Tony Blair's New Labour Government (1997-
2007) that the British state began to deport unwanted migrants on any significant scale: in 
1999 about 9,000 deportations took place, by 2010 this had risen to 70,000. In the same 
period, the Government first set itself numerical targets for the removal of "failed asylum 
seekers" and "immigration offenders" (Weber & Bowling 2008: 361). In 2001, the Home 
Office began to charter commercial planes to undertake mass deportations of failed asylum 
seekers, a practice which over the course of the following decade was extended to other 
categories of unwanted migrants, and is now commonplace (Miller 2018). The use of charter 
flights enabled the Home Office to remove "from the public gaze the spectacle of bound and 
struggling men and women" on commercial flights (Weber & Bowling 2008: 361). This was a 
strategic decision for, as Antje Ellermann has argued, when confronted with "the human face 
of deportation" the public "often become far more sensitive to the claims of those the state is 
attempting to expel" (2006: 296). However, the Home Office also recognised that these 
'shadow flights' might act as a deterrent to future refugees. In 2004, they contracted an 
Associated Press Television News team to "video the forced deportation of approximately 
two dozen Afghans from Gatwick airport so that the film could subsequently be broadcast in 
Afghanistan as part of a programme warning" those considering coming to Britain that they 
could face a similar fate (Fekete 2005: 20).6  
In Go Home? The Politics of Immigration Controversies (2017) Hannah Jones, Yasmin 
Gunarathnam, Gargi Bhattacharyya, William Davies, Sucwant Dahaliwl, Kirsteen Forket, 
Emma Jackson and Roiyah Saltus further mapped the genealogy of this deportation 
propaganda machine. As they detail, in 2006 Tony Blair appointed a new 'hard-line' Home 
Secretary, John Reid (2006-2007), in response to a series of scandals around perceived 
failures to deport foreign criminals and control levels of 'illegal migration'. Reid immediately 
launched a new communications strategy designed to demonstrate "a visibly tough approach 
to controlling borders and movement" (Jones et al. 2017: 13). This included "getting more 
images of immigration raids into the media" by "inviting journalists along to witness raids" in 
order to garner "media attention to the physical 'toughness' of the border" (ibid.). Whilst this 
deportation publicity ostensibly targeted "immigration offenders", it now also had "an 
audience of the law-abiding and taxpaying public in mind" (ibid.). This shift in audience was 
made explicit in 2008, when the Home Office funded an independent television production 
company to develop a reality television programme called UK Border Force (Steadfast/Sky, 
2008-2009). This programme was advertised as "a revealing new documentary series which 
takes you behind the scenes at Heathrow Terminal 3, Calais, Dover and out and about with 
diligent enforcement teams – all cracking down on illegal immigrants" (Burnett 2009). UK 
Border Force established a set of aesthetic and dramatic conventions for border enforcement 
which remained in evidence in ITN's production of 'immigration raid action sequences' in 
Slough in 2014. Indeed, by the time of David Cameron's televised appearance alongside an 
immigration 'snatch squad', the British public were primed in a televisual aesthetic of 
enforcement in which border officials appear as patriotic citizen-soldiers on the front-line of 
'the immigration invasion'.  
In 2010, Theresa May was appointed Home Secretary and the now established political 
use of deportation "to send a signal – to a nation-state's citizens as well as its 'outsiders'" 
significantly intensified (De Genova & Peutz 2010: 28). May had been tasked with meeting a 
Conservative Party manifesto pledge to radically reduce net immigration (Runciman 2017). 
The promise to voters that immigration would be "capped" at "tens of thousands" was an 
ambition which politicians and civil servants privately agreed was technically impossible 
while Britain remained a member of the EU and a signatory to several international 
agreements around refugee and human rights protections (Rosa 2010). Seemingly undeterred 
by these facts, May introduced a suite of policy reforms designed to reduce net migration, 
focused on increasing the number of 'voluntary returns'. In one high-profile initiative in 2012, 
the Home Office contracted Capita, a major provider of outsourced services to the public 
sector, "to find and remove the estimated 174,000 migrants who have overstayed their visas" 
(Back & Sinha 2013). Capita's contract was reported to be worth up to £40 million over four 
years, with payments tied to the number of people who left the country after being contacted 
by them. Capita were given access to Home Office databases and proceeded to contact 58,800 
people via a text message which read: "Message from the UK Border Agency. You are 
required to leave the UK as you no longer have the right to remain". It transpired that many of 
those who received this text message had the legal right to be resident in the UK. However, 
these errors accrued more publicity for the initiative, which underscored the purpose of this 
and similar campaigns, namely to 1) generate publicity to demonstrate the Government 
commitment to meeting its manifesto promise and 2) amplify anxiety and fear amongst 
migrant populations in order to effect 'voluntary returns'.  
This use of text messages to encourage people to "go home" revealed the extent to which 
deportation now functioned as a central sorting and classifying mechanism within British 
society, an anxiety-inducing deportation machine which had been mainlined into every aspect 
of social and cultural life. As Les Back and Shamser Sinha (2013) note, the use of mobile 
phones as instruments of border control was indicative of the ways in which the border was 
moving and proliferating. The border was no longer confined to ports and airports, or even to 
the mandatory immigration reporting systems introduced to places of employment, 
universities, schools, hospitals, banks and more. Now the border could follow people, 
spreading tentacle-like through existing communications networks into people's intimate 
everyday lives in order to capture "unwanted or unneeded people" (ibid.). 
As the Go Home? book documents, in the summer of 2013, the Home Office launched a 
further "series of high-profile initiatives aimed at directing public attention to what the 
government was doing to control 'illegal immigration'" (Jones et al. 2015). One campaign, 
codenamed Operation Vaken, included a "Go Home Van" in which a mobile billboard with 
the slogan "In the UK illegally? GO HOME OR FACE ARREST" was driven around areas of 
London deemed to have high migrant populations. The van invited people to voluntarily "Go 
Home" (or alternatively face arrest) by texting "Home on 7870". It further encouraged citizens 
to report on "suspect" neighbours and colleagues via a special hotline. Operation Vaken also 
saw the first extensive use of government social media accounts in a border enforcement 
campaign, employing the hashtag #immigrationoffenders to publicise arrests during a series 
of extensive high-profile 'stop and search' operations at London tube stations and numerous 
immigration raids on places of employment. Inside immigration reporting centres in and near 
London and Glasgow, a poster campaign was launched: one poster featured an image of an 
aeroplane with the slogan "This plane can take you home. We can book the tickets"; others 
were emblazoned with the slogans "Go Home or Face Arrest"; "Is life here hard? Going home 
is simple"; "Going home is as easy as 1, 2, 3". Stickers on chairs in the waiting room stated, 
"Ask about going home". The use of the phrase 'Go Home' caused particular disconcertion 
amongst Britain's Black and Asian communities, as a slogan which had "featured 
prominently" in racist National Front graffiti in the 1970s and 1980s (Grayson 2013). As 
Channel 4 News presenter Krishnan Guru-Murthy noted:  
It is the use of that phrase "Go Home". Anyone, any immigrant or non-white 
person who grew up in the '60s, '70s and '80s heard that phrase as a term of racist 
abuse – and the government has put it on a poster. (Quoted in Grayson 2013)  
As the authors of Go Home? argue, Operation Vaken marked "a turning point in the climate 
of immigration debates – a ratcheting up of anti-migrant feeling to the point where it was 
possible for a government sponsored advertisement to use the same hate speech and rhetoric 
as far-right racists" (Jones et al. 2015). 
 
3.  Britain First 
In July 2015, a year after the immigration raids in Slough, and a week before the referendum 
on Britain's continued membership of the EU, Jo Cox – a pro-European Labour MP, and a 
champion of the positive impacts of immigration – was shot and stabbed to death in the street 
by a far-right terrorist. Her attacker repeatedly shouted "Britain First", "this is for Britain" and 
"keep Britain independent" as he murdered her. "Britain First" is the name of a far-right anti-
Islamic and anti-immigration group who gained global notoriety in 2017 when US President 
Donald Trump retweeted two anti-Islamic propaganda videos. The slogan "Britain First" was 
also adopted by Leave campaigners in the period leading up to the Brexit referendum. As 
Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever have detailed, the Leave campaign pivoted on "the 
construction of the migrant" as both an "economic threat to the domestic working class" and 
"as a security threat to the British population" (2017: 5). The central message was that to vote 
'leave' was to put 'Britain first' by enabling the Government to 'take back control' of its 
borders from the EU. However, the phrase 'Britain First', and the claim to be 'taking back 
control' had another recent provenance, as a 'dog whistle' phrase deliberately employed by the 
Home Office in its Hostile Environment campaign. As David Cameron iterated at Slough, 
"we want an immigration system that puts Britain first".  
In a report titled Racial Violence and the Brexit State, the Institute for Race Relations 
details how the Brexit referendum functioned as a catalyst for widespread racial harassment 
and violence (cf. Burnett 2016). In the wake of the Brexit vote to leave the EU in June 2016, 
there was an unprecedented rise – at least a 50% increase – in reported racially motivated hate 
speech and attacks: "more than 6,000 racist hate crimes were reported to the National Police 
Chiefs Council (NPCC) in the four weeks after the referendum result was declared. Incidents 
ranged from physical assault and property damage to verbal abuse" (Virdee & McGeever 
2017: 7). Notably, the phrase 'Go Home', another slogan employed in the Home Office's 
Hostile Environment campaign, was one of the most commonly reported invectives daubed as 
graffiti in public places and homes and directed at people on social media and on the street. 
For example, Lauren Stonebanks, a Scottish woman of mixed race, was getting on a bus with 
her child the day after the Brexit vote in Edinburgh when a passenger shouted, "Get your 
passport, you're fucking going home" (Duffy 2016). "I have encountered racial slurs before" 
she told journalists, "but being told to go home was something I have not heard since the 
1980s in the school playground" (ibid.; my emphasis).  
In July 2016, Theresa May, the architect of the 'Go Home' campaign, succeeded David 
Cameron as Prime Minister. May publicly condemned the dramatic increase in hate speech 
and racist attacks. The relationship between the racializing nationalism fermented by May's 
Hostile Environment campaigns and policies and the subsequent success of a Leave campaign 
which adopted the very same discourses and sentiments, is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, as the Institute for Race Relations asked, "if a hostile environment is embedded 
politically, why should we be surprised when it takes root culturally?" (Burnett 2016: 4). 
Certainly, it is reasonable to argue that the racist violence that followed in the wake of the 
Brexit vote wasn't "just a 'spike', a 'jump' or a 'spate', as the mainstream consensus has it" but 
was rather "a literal manifestation" of the divisive anti-immigrant state racism which 
immediately preceded it (Burnett 2016: 8).  
 
4.  “Brexit Means Brexit Means Go Home” (Piacentini, 2016) 
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum result in June 2016, newspapers were filled with 
stories about EU nationals who had been long-term residents of the UK, often married to and 
parents of UK citizens, and who, on application for citizenship, were told to leave the country. 
Colin Talbot, a Professor of Government at the University of Manchester, recounted on his 
blog the story of meeting a "visibly distressed" academic colleague at work, who had received 
a "Go Home" letter from the Home Office, which included the standard paragraph: 
As you appear to have no alternative basis of stay in the United Kingdom you 
should now make arrangements to leave. If you fail to make a voluntary departure 
a separate decision may be made at a later date to enforce your removal (British 
Home Office Rejection of Residency Letter 2017, quoted in Talbot, 2017). 
As Talbot notes, those reading these words in Home Office letters are often people who are 
legally entitled to be in and remain in the UK, but have failed to correctly navigate the 
"Kafkaesque complexity" (2017) of the permanent residency application process. 
Nevertheless, accounts of receiving instructions to 'Go Home' engendered fear and panic 
among many EU migrants. Notably, newspaper and television news stories on this topic 
tended to feature professionally employed middle-class EU nationals and were frequently 
narrated from a position of unchecked privilege, in disbelief that (white) Europeans might 
become subject to Britain's deeply illiberal immigration enforcement system: a "deportation 
machine" (Fekete 2005) which has terrorised, incarcerated and ejected non-European 
migrants for decades. Nevertheless, the extension of these existing deportation regimes to EU 
residents vividly illustrates the extent to which "Brexit means Brexit means go home" 
(Piacentini 2016). At the time of writing, people from "European Economic Area" (EEA) 
countries still ostensibly have the right to live in the UK: for three months without condition, 
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and for longer if they are employed, seeking work, studying or are economically self-
sufficient. However, since the Brexit vote, "more than 12,800 EU citizens had their permanent 
residency requests refused with a further 5,500 declared invalid, a rejection rate of around 
28%" (Elgot 2017). Further, official government data shows 5,000 EU citizens were deported 
from Britain in 2017, "the highest since current records began" and "up from just 973" in 
2010 (Kentish 2017). However, even before the Brexit vote was cast, there was evidence that 
'undesirable' and 'economically unproductive' EU nationals were being detained and deported 
in growing numbers.  
In May 2016, the Home Office issued new guidelines which created an exemption to the 
rights of residence for EU citizens who were deemed homeless (Yeo 2017). Under the terms 
of this new directive, "sleeping rough", even for a single night, was interpreted as an "abuse 
of Treaty rights", and made you "legally" subject to deportation (Corporate Watch 2017). This 
classification of EU citizens deemed to be "sleeping rough" as "European Economic Area 
nationals not exercising treaty rights in the UK" marked a significant extension and deepening 
of deportation regimes (Yeo 2017). In the wake of the Brexit vote, the guidance on detaining 
and deporting rough sleepers was implemented with zeal in London, with immigration 'snatch 
squads' specifically targeting Eastern European nationals (Corporate Watch 2017). In 2017, 
Corporate Watch published a report, "The Round-Up: Rough Sleeper Immigration Raids and 
Charity Collaboration" about the extension of deportation, drawing on Home Office policy 
statements and documents (some accessed through Freedom of Information requests), 
personal interviews with homelessness workers, (former) rough sleepers, and eyewitness 
statements. The report includes the testimony of one man who was detained and deported 
after neighbours reported him sleeping in his car, and another who was sleeping rough after a 
row with his partner: 
I had somewhere to stay, but I had an argument with my partner and that's why I 
was sleeping rough in [Central London]. They arrested me and put me [in 
immigration detention]. I have agreed to voluntarily return to [Eastern Europe] 
because I want to get out of detention, if you don't agree you can stay here for 
months (Corporate Watch 2017).  
Corporate Watch specifically sought to ascertain the role of local authorities and homeless 
charities in rounding up EU-nationals for deportation. What they found was that local 
authorities and homeless charities in London (notably St Mungo's) were working with 
Immigration Enforcement Officials to apprehend EU nationals on the streets and, more, that 
they were being paid for each subsequent successful deportation.  
Several nights a week, immigration patrols are out targeting rough sleepers in 
London, now a prime focus for raids under Theresa May's "hostile environment" 
policy. The arrests are carried out by Home Office "Immigration Compliance and 
Enforcement" (ICE) teams. But they rely on the active collaboration of the Mayor, 
local councils, and homelessness charities. (Corporate Watch 2017)  
This policy marked the further deepening of existing regimes of deportability. The fate of the 
estimated 800,000 EU citizens currently resident in Britain remains uncertain, but their right 
to remain will certainly further unfold along lines of class and nationality. Brexit currently 
marks the intensification of a more authoritarian, nationalistic form of government in Britain, 
one of the central characteristics and mechanisms of which is the "ever-intensifying 
magnitude of deportation" as a practice of sovereign power (Peutz and De Genova 2010: 7). 
 
5.  Deportation Nation  
As deportation has become increasingly normalised in Britain, it is important to remember 
that the expulsion of people from a territory "on the basis of nationality and state membership 
is a relatively recent phenomenon" (Walters 2002: 271).7 As De Genova argues, in the early 
twentieth century, "it was commonly considered to be frankly unconscionable, even by some 
immigration judges, to inflict the plainly punitive, 'barbarous and cruel' hardship of expulsion 
on unauthorized but otherwise lawful migrants and their families" (2010: 34). However, 
Matthew Gibney argues that since the 1990s, there has been "a deportation turn" within 
liberal democracies across the world (Anderson, Gibney & Paoletti 2011: 547). This 
"prodigious rise in the use of deportation" has seen "developments in infrastructural capacity 
and legal powers to deport" and a "new-found public and official enthusiasm for expulsion" 
(ibid.).  
It is in this longer historical context that we need to understand how and why deportation is 
no longer imagined as an extreme and exceptional use of state power, but has been recast as a 
just, reasonable and proportionate response to unwanted migrants. This article has sought to 
highlight the ways in which deportation, or more precisely, "the production of deportability", 
has become an increasingly central characteristic of British society over the last two decades 
(De Genova & Peutz 2010: 17). It focused in particular on Theresa May's six-year tenure as 
Home Secretary (2010-2016), a period which was characterised by propaganda campaigns 
that sought to demonstrate the state's willingness to forcibly deport unwanted people. May's 
'hostile environment' politics marked a divisive moment in British political history during 
which migration came to be imagined as akin to a crime against the state, and deportation – 
encouraging or forcing people to 'Go Home' – was constructed as a logical solution to this 
offence. The multiple impacts of the normalization of deportation in Britain are still 
unfolding. As the current (and at the time of writing, still unfolding) Windrush scandal has 
revealed, even residents who had been invited to migrate to Britain to work many decades 
ago, nor their children or grandchildren, are immune from this ferocious regime of 
disenfranchisement and expulsion.  
Despite her best efforts, Theresa May failed to meet the 2010 Conservative Manifesto 
election promise to significantly reduce net migration. Indeed, British Government statistics 
(which are partial and limited) reveal that the number of people forcibly deported from the 
UK has remained fairly static over the last two decades. The visibility of deportation as a 
spectacle of sovereign power, then, didn't lead to an increase in deportations. What the 
available data does suggest is that the number of voluntary departures is increasing. As the 
current trend to 'encourage' EU nationals to leave suggests, this is likely to continue when 
Britain formally leaves the EU in 2019. However, May's hostile environment policies have 
made increasing numbers of people 'deportable', and in doing so has made it much harder for 
those without the right papers to access paid work, health care, housing and other social 
provisions. This underscores that what is at stake in the politics of deportation isn't only an 
increase in removals, even when this is the stated aim of the policy. Rather, what May's 
hostile environment policies have produced is an increase in 'illegality', and with it a 
significant escalation in the vulnerability of (some) migrants to harm and exploitation. Indeed, 
deportation is not simply an instrument of immigration control at all, but is a penal tactic: 
'deportable people' demarcate the limits of citizenship "signalling who will not be entitled to 
[state] protection, and throwing fear into the rest of us" (Kerber 2007: 14-15). In this regard, 
deportability is intimately bound up with other neoliberal practices of disposability. Policies 
which make increasing numbers of people 'deportable' through, for example, increasing 
governmental checks on legibility to work, study or live in Britain; and policies which make 
other unwanted people 'disposable', for example state-led practices of gentrification which 
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new ‘illiberal consensus’ across Europe.   
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